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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1731 
_____________ 
 
JOSEPH R. REISINGER,  
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COUNTY OF LUZERNE; LUZERNE COUNTY TAX CLAIM BUREAU; MARY 
DYSLESKI; STEPHEN A. URBAN; NEIL T. O’DONNELL; JAMES P. BLAUM; 
CADLE CO. II; DANIEL C. CADLE; DOUG HARRAH; KEVIN T. FOGERTY; TINA 
RANDAZZO; NOVA SAVINGS BANK; CRAIG SCHER 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of  Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 3-09-cv-01554 
District Judge: The Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
_____________                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 26, 2011) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 The plaintiff owned 26 parcels of real property situate in Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania.  The Luzerne County Tax Claim Bureau determined that the plaintiff had 
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failed to pay the real estate taxes assessed on the properties and asked a Pennsylvania 
state court to authorize a tax sale.  The court granted the Bureau’s request.  The plaintiff 
then filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights to 
procedural due process and equal protection had been violated in the course of the tax-
sale proceedings; the complaint also asserted a host of state-law claims.  When the 
plaintiff filed this lawsuit, the tax-sale proceeding was ongoing: the sale had yet to take 
place or to be confirmed, as required under Pennsylvania law.   
The District Court dismissed the complaint.  It held, first, that the plaintiff’s suit is 
barred by the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 
413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).  
The Court concluded, in the alternative, that dismissal was appropriate because the 
complaint failed to state a federal claim upon which relief can be granted.  Reisinger v. 
Luzerne County, 712 F. Supp. 2d 332, 352–57 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (concluding that the 
complaint does not state a due process or equal protection claim and declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims).  Finally, the Court denied leave to 
amend the federal claims on the ground of futility.   
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo a district 
court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss.  Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 
2007).  At the outset, we agree with the plaintiff that this suit is not barred by Rooker-
Feldman.  The doctrine is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”  Exxon 
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Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  As far as the record 
shows, judgment had not been entered in the state-court proceeding at the time the 
plaintiff filed this § 1983 lawsuit.  The state-court proceeding thus lacked the finality 
necessary to trigger Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional bar.  See id. at 291–94.  See also 
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (“[U]nder what has come to be known as the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate 
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.”).   
We nonetheless agree with the District Court that the complaint fails to state a due 
process or equal protection claim.  Even accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as 
true (as we must), it is clear that the plaintiff received notice of the tax-sale proceeding 
and was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard by an impartial decisionmaker (a 
state-court judge).  The Due Process Clause required nothing more.  It is also clear that 
the Tax Claim Bureau had a rational basis for treating the plaintiff differently from other 
property owners: he had failed to satisfy his tax obligation.  His equal protection claim is 
thus unfounded.  Finally, the District Court properly denied leave to amend because 
granting it would have been futile.   
We will affirm. 
